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Book Review
AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY AND 
WHAT WE OWN, by Stuart Banner 1
DOUGLAS C. HARRIS 2
PROPERTY LAW IS ABOUT THINGS, but only secondarily. It is primarily about 
relationships between people as they pertain to things. As a result, although 
we commonly identify material and immaterial things as private, common, or 
state property, property law deals with th e subset of human relationships that 
determines rights and responsibilities with respect to things. Th e institution of 
property law—the rules that defi ne this subset of human relationships—arises 
in the context of scarcity. When things are scarce and accordingly hold exchange 
value, humans construct ideas of ownership. We have been doing so for 
millennia, or at least long enough that the subject of property law has acquired 
a reputation as antiquarian. Certainly in the common law tradition, many 
property law courses appear lost in the mist of English legal history. Th is need 
not be so. Property law deals with the allocation of scarce resources and therefore 
is also about the allocation of power. Understood this way, property law can be a 
lens through which to understand many of the most pressing social issues of the 
day. Similarly, the history of property law need not be dull. At least ten centuries of 
social change, economic transformation, technological innovation, and human 
drama can be seen in the customs and conventions, judicial decisions, and statutes 
that comprise the law of property in common law jurisdictions.
In American Property: A History of How, Why and What We Own, Stuart 
Banner, the prolifi c legal historian and property law scholar, sets out to describe 
contestation and change in ideas about property over several centuries in the 
United States.3 Th e result is a beautifully and accessibly written book, stunning 
1. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011).
2. Nathan T Nemetz Chair in Legal History, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia.
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in scope, elegant in structure, and remarkably revealing in its detail about the 
debates over and the uses of property law doctrine and of the broader ideas that 
support the divergent interests and claims. 
Banner provides a rough chronological structure for the book, devoting most 
of his attention to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, although the fourteen 
chapters are not identifi ed by decade or era. Instead, the individual chapters focus 
on specifi c themes and can be tied loosely into bundles, each animated by a set of 
shared questions. One thematic bundle addresses changing understandings of the 
idea of property.4 In these chapters, Banner situates analyses of changing property 
doctrine in the politics of property and, more specifi cally, in the balancing of 
public regulation and private property.
In “A Bundle of Rights,” for example, Banner disputes the conventional account 
of the emergence of this metaphor for property, arguing that it appeared in the 
nineteenth century as part of an eff ort to enhance constitutional protection for 
private property—not in the early twentieth century in the service of a progressive 
eff ort to enhance state intervention in the economy, as has been conventionally 
understood. Banner also provides an engaging account of the Realist articulation 
of property as power in a later chapter, “People, Not Th ings.” Nevertheless, he 
maintains that the metaphor appeared earlier, in the service of those looking to 
enhance rather than diminish protection for private property: “In the late 
nineteenth century,” writes Banner, “the idea of property as a bundle of rights was 
a distinctly antiregulatory idea, one that served the specifi c purpose of justifying 
constitutional doctrines that would limit the power of legislatures to regulate in 
ways that would reduce the value of property.”5
Interspersed through these chapters on the idea of property are fi ve chapters 
about “owning”—owning news, sound, fame, wavelengths, and life—in which 
Banner describes the eff orts to reconfi gure property in the face of new technologies. 
In many instances, new technology made existing property rights worthless, or at 
3. Stuart Banner’s earlier books include Who Owns the Sky: Th e Struggle to Control Airspace from 
the Wright Brothers On (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008); Possessing the Pacifi c: 
Land, Settlers, and Indigenous People from Australia to Alaska (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2007); How the Indians Lost Th eir Land: Law and Power on the Frontier (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2005); and Legal Systems in Confl ict: Property and Sovereignty in 
Missouri, 1750-1860 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000).
4. Th is bundle includes fi ve chapters: “A Bundle of Rights,” “People, Not Th ings,” “Law of the 
Land,” “Th e New Property,” and “Property Resurgent.” See Banner, supra note 1, ch 3 at 45; 
supra note 1, ch 5 at 94; supra note 1, ch 9 at 181; supra note 1, ch 11 at 220; supra note 1, 
ch 13 at 257 (respectively). 
5. Ibid at 71-72. 
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least much less valuable. In “Owning Sound,”6 for example, Banner recounts how 
composers, music publishers, recording companies, musicians, and broadcasters 
responded to a series of technological changes—phonographs, player pianos, 
radios, vinyl records, Long Play records, and cassette tapes—that allowed humans 
to capture, broadcast, and mass distribute sound. Banner focuses on the changing 
coalitions of interest that sought to construct and then to preserve property 
rights, and therefore value, in the face of technological innovations that had the 
eff ect of undermining once-profi table activities. Th ose in the music industry 
focused their eff orts on the law of copyright, and Banner reveals a mutually constitutive 
dynamic between that industry, technological change, and the law. Th e result in 
law is a royalty regime in which composers and music publishers earn money 
when their songs are recorded or played for audiences, but performers and record 
companies do not. How has this aff ected the making of music? Banner notes the 
disappearance of the once sharp line between composers and performers. In the 
1950s, only seven per cent of popular songs were performed by their composers; 
in 2004, eighty-eight per cent of performers were playing their own songs.7 Bob 
Dylan may well have inspired a generation of singer-songwriters, but Banner’s 
analysis also suggests that the outcome of disputes over the ownership of sound 
in the creative process of music making should not be ignored.
In addition to these thematically bundled chapters, Banner includes an 
introductory chapter on the forms of property that were lost in the trans-Atlantic 
migration of the common law (varieties of land tenures and estates, many non-
possessory interests, rights of common, et cetera) as land was increasingly 
refashioned as “just another commodity to be bought and sold.”8 Th ere is also a 
chapter on “Th e Rise of Intellectual Property”9 (a subject that fi gures prominently in 
most of the “owning” chapters) and a chapter on the changing legal architecture 
of home ownership as the introduction of cooperative and later condominium 
enhanced the possibility of owning single units in multi-unit developments.10 
In this chapter, Banner asks why condominium, which provided such an eff ective 
means of dividing ownership in multi-unit buildings, did not arrive in the United 
States sooner than the 1960s. He off ers a number of “institutional obstacles”11 
as explanation, including the reticence of title insurers to insure single units in 
6. Ibid, ch 6 at 109. 
7. Ibid at 128.
8. Ibid at 20.
9. Ibid, ch 2 at 23. 
10. Ibid, ch 8 at 177 (“From the Tenement to the Condominium”). 
11. Ibid at 176. 
(2012) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL468
multi-unit buildings, the hesitation of mortgage lenders to take that property 
interest as security for a loan, the inability of municipal bureaucracies to impose 
and collect property taxes on individual units in multi-unit buildings, and the 
uncertainty around the drafting of instruments to defi ne the individual units and 
the rights and responsibilities attached to them. Statutory provisions in the 1960s 
would help overcome most of these obstacles and, once surmounted, condominium as 
a legal form would proliferate rapidly, particularly where land prices were high.12 
Banner’s analysis is a good example of his capacity to move between legal doctrine, 
broader ideas about property, and the social and institutional setting to explain 
shifts in the way that people own property.
American Property is not a comprehensive survey of the history of property 
law in the United States and was not written as one. Land and intellectual property 
receive most of the attention, personal property receives almost none. Th ere is no 
discussion of family property or Aboriginal property,13 and Banner has said that 
he wished he had been prescient enough about the collapse in American housing markets 
to include a chapter on mortgages.14 Although the idea of common property 
is mentioned—once when Banner describes the stripping of various forms of 
property from the law in the transplanting of the English common law to North 
America, and again when he discusses private property as one response to the 
tragedy of the commons—it does not receive focused attention. Similarly, state 
property is the starting point for the chapter on the licensing of the radio wave-
length spectrum,15 but serves primarily as a backdrop for Banner’s focus on the 
allocation of private rights.
In addition, Banner does not off er an overarching explanation or argument 
about the role of law, nor of property law in particular. Many chapters end with 
equivocal statements about the eff ect of the property regimes described: “there 
would be winners and losers from land use regulation”;16 “the new property was 
simply not as powerful a tool as its proponents hoped or its opponents feared”;17 
“property remained an important value, but so did sound governance.”18 At 
several points in the book, including the fi nal sentence, Banner suggests that 
12. See Douglas C Harris, “Condominium and the City: Th e Rise of Property in Vancouver” 
(2011) 36:3 Law & Soc Inq 694. 
13. Banner has published extensively on property law and Aboriginal peoples. See supra note 3. 
14. Stuart Banner, “Author Meets Critics” (Seminar delivered at the Th ird Annual Association for 
Law, Property and Society Conference, Washington DC, 2 & 3 March 2012), [unpublished].
15. Supra note 1, ch 10 at 211 (“Owning Wavelengths”). 
16. Supra note 1 at 201.
17. Ibid at 237.
18. Ibid at 275.
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“property has always been a means rather than an ends.”19 Th is is consistent 
with his overall message that property doctrine is a malleable and contested 
structure of ideas deployed for particular purposes, but Banner does not off er 
a larger framework in which to understand the outcome of those contests, nor 
does he evaluate attempts of others to do so. Willard Hurst’s argument that the 
property law regime created the conditions for American economic expansion 
in the nineteenth century is an indirect presence but is not directly engaged.20 A 
discussion of Morton Horwitz’s class-infl ected analysis is similarly absent,21 as is 
an engagement with Harold Demsetz’s law and economics inspired account of 
the emergence of property rights.22 Banner is certainly interested in the politics 
of property, but he does not use the material to develop a larger explana-
tory framework or to reveal his assessment of which ideas about property are to 
be preferred beyond the observation that property should not be understood as 
pre-political.
Although Banner might well have considered the interplay of private, 
common, and state property, or engaged explicitly with the attempts of some 
historians to develop larger explanatory frameworks, these and other absences are 
less shortcomings than simply refl ections of the limits of this project. American 
Property is a model of historical legal scholarship and a pleasure to use in the 
classroom. A student in my legal history course admitted to enrolling only after 
he had spent the better part of an afternoon in the university bookstore reading 
American Property, the central text for the course. Banner’s work will resonate not 
only for legal historians of the United States, but also for those interested in changing 
ideas of property and the interplay of law with technological and social change.
19. Ibid at 291.
20. James Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in Nineteenth-Century United States 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956).
21. Morton Horwitz, Th e Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1977); Morton Horwitz, Th e Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
22. Harold Demsetz, “Toward a Th eory of Property Rights” (1967) 57:2 Am Econ Rev 347. 
